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When income units are homogeneous in non-income characteristics, there exist many
tools to make welfare comparisons between income distributions and the properties
of these tools are well-understood (Lambert, 2001 for an overview). Unfortunately,
these tools are too restrictive to make reasonable comparisons in practice, because:
At the heart of any distributional analysis, there is the problem of allowing for diﬀerences
in people’s non-income characteristics. (Cowell and Mercader-Prats, 1999)
Therefore, practitioners have adapted standard tools in a simple way: ﬁrst, convert the
heterogeneous distribution of income and non-income characteristics into an equiva-
lent distribution of living standards and second, apply the preferred standard tool to
the distribution of living standards, either unweighted, or weighted by the number of
individuals. The essence of the living standard function is thus to compress both in-
come and non-income characteristics into a single comparable measure of well-being.
This compression is often performed by dividing income by an equivalence scale factor
to obtain equivalent incomes.
Glewwe (1991) suggests that transfers from poor to rich could decrease inequality.
Both Ebert (1997) and Shorrocks (1995) analyze this problem formally and show
that, under some standard assumptions, the problem essentially boils down to an
incompatibility between Pareto indiﬀerence1 — which requires indiﬀerence between two
distributions with equal living standards for all individuals — and a between type Pigou-
Dalton (BTPD) transfer principle — which socially prefers mean-preserving income
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1Ebert (1997) considers the stronger anonymity axiom deﬁned over living standards.transfers which make living standards more equal. The incompatibility can also be
expressed in a diﬀerent and more interesting way. When using equivalence scales
to accomodate for diﬀerences in needs, the cited authors show that weighting income
units by the (normalized) number of individuals is the only procedure satisfying Pareto
indiﬀerence, whereas weighting income units by the (normalized) number of equivalent
individuals is the only one satisfying the BTPD transfer principle. The ad hoc two
step procedure of practitioners, as described above, satisﬁes Pareto indiﬀerence if one
applies weighting by individuals, but not the BTPD transfer principle and the latter
is precisely a more general way to translate Glewwe’s message.
For heterogeneous welfare comparisons, Shorrocks (1995) prefers Pareto indiﬀer-
ence and thus weighting with the (normalized) number of individuals, whereas Ebert
(1997) seems to favour the BTPD transfer principle and weighting with the (normal-
ized) equivalent number of individuals. Although it is essentially a choice between
principles, a choice is not easily envisaged. We give two examples to make the dif-
ﬁculty clear and we therefore introduce some notation. We refer to income units by
the index i =1 ,...,n and yi, ni and mi refer respectively to the income, the num-
ber of individuals and the equivalence scale (or the number of equivalent individuals)
of income unit i. We assume a continuous, additively separable, strictly increasing
and concave social welfare function deﬁned over living standards. Following Pareto














i ni and the valuation function V is strictly increasing and concave. Following















Consider the following simple example. Suppose two societies, which consist of
singles (s) and couples (c). Singles are the reference type (equivalence scale equal to
1) and the equivalence scale of a couple equals 1.5. Society 1 contains a single and a
couple, while society 2 has three singles. One single in both societies has an income
— and living standard — equal to y. The couple in society 1 has a household income
of 6 units and the living standard of each individual in this household equals 4. The
other singles in the second society have an income equal to 4. The situation can be
summarized in Example 1.












2Pareto indiﬀerence requires to rank both societies equal in terms of social welfare,
since all individuals have the same living standard, irrespective of the value of y.
































which is only possible for all V if y =4 . In all other cases, we will have a strict
preference for one of both societies, a rather counter-intuitive conclusion. There-
fore, one might think Pareto indiﬀerence is indispensable for heterogeneous welfare
comparisons.
Let us now turn to the between type Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. Consider
again society 1 in example 1, but the incomes of the single and the couple equal
respectively 5 and 15. Consider a money transfer of three units from the couple to the
single. The situation of society 1 before and after the transfer can be summarized in
Example 2.
Example 2. The between type Pigou-Dalton transfer principle
society 1 before transfer
household sc
income 51 5
equivalence scale 11 . 5
living standard 51 0
←→
society 1 after transfer
household sc
income 81 2
equivalence scale 11 . 5
living standard 88
A money transfer which makes living standards more equal always has to raise
social welfare according to the BTPD transfer principle. Indeed, using WB,s o c i a l


















which is precisely social welfare after the transfer. Using WA however, social welfare







3which is not necessarily smaller compared to social welfare after the transfer, V (8).
More precisely, it will depend on the concavity of the utility function. To make things
clear, consider a (concave) iso-elastic utility function
V :
x → 1
1−εx1−ε, ε  =1
x → lnx, ε =1
with ε > 0 measuring the degree of concavity. Now, choosing ε extremely small (let
ε → 0 and WA comes arbitrarily close to the average living standard) we will prefer
the society before the transfer to the society after the transfer. Choosing ε extremely
large (let ε →∞and WA comes arbitrarily close to the (lexicographical) minimum
living standard) we will prefer the society after the transfer to the society before the
transfer. To conclude, if one thinks the BTPD transfer principle is always interesting,
one might be inclined to use WB rather than WA, since the latter only satisﬁes it
when the degree of concavity is suﬃciently large.2
Both examples indicate that a choice between the two principles — and thus also
between the corresponding weighting principles — is not easy. But, if the diﬀerence
between both normative properties does not translate into a diﬀerent comparison in
most empirical applications, it could be rather futile. Accordingly, the question we
raise in our paper is simple. Do we observe large diﬀerences between the two alter-
native weighting methods empirically? We certainly do not claim that a normative
choice can ultimately be reduced to an empirical question and that this question can
be solved by looking at one particular case. But at least we hope to shed light on this
question which, as far as we know, has not been treated elsewhere before.
Our paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces some notation and
presents our methodology in a formal way. Section 3 describes the data and section 4
shows our main results. A ﬁnal section summarizes the discussion as well as our main
ﬁndings.
2. A framework for the social planner
A social planner is facing two distinct questions. The ﬁrst one is how to measure the
well-being of individuals given their household income and household composition.
The other is how to aggregate these well-beings to obtain a measure of social welfare.
We will ﬁrst present the necessary notation before answering both questions.
Income units are fully characterized by their income y ∈ IR+ and non-income
characteristics and we assume that we can divide the population in a ﬁnite number
of types k =1 ,...,K based on these non-income characteristics. We will consider
diﬀerences in household size nk and we allow for a diﬀerent treatment of adults and
children. More precisely, the number of adults and children in type k households equal
respectively na
k and nc
k, and thus for all k we need nk = na
k + nc
k.
The ultimate goal of a social planner is to make heterogeneous welfare comparisons,
i.e. welfare comparisons between heterogeneous distributions of nominal household
2Notice that there exists a rule which (more than) satisﬁes both the BTPD transfer principle and
Pareto indiﬀerence, to wit, the leximin rule, but this rule is excluded in Ebert (1997) and Shorrocks
(1995), since both authors start from a continuous social welfare function.
4incomes, F and G for instance. Both distributions are deﬁned over a common ﬁnite in-
come support and can be decomposed in subdistributions Fk (or Gk) and proportions
pk (or qk)f o re a c ht y p ek such that F (y)=
S
k pkFk (y) (or G(y)=
S
k qkGk (y))
measures the proportion of households with an income lower or equal to y under
distribution F (or G).
2.1. Measuring well-being
The well-being of individuals is measured simply by correcting household income y
through an equivalence scale factor mk > 0, or for all types k, living standard functions
are simply deﬁned as:




We stress that vk (y) measures the living standard of each individual who lives in
a household of type k with household income y. The equivalence scale mk reﬂects
“needs” in the following simple way. A household with a larger equivalence scale
needs more income to reach the same living standard.
One simple way to correct incomes is to use a parametric equivalence scale (Banks




θ , 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1,0 ≤ η ≤ 1 (2.2)
η is the way in which children are converted in adults and we will choose η =0 .5
(Jenkins and Cowell, 1994). We can now deﬁne adult-equivalents as h nk = na
k +0.5nc
k.
The parameter θ is the equivalence scale elasticity, measuring the percentage change in
equivalence scale m for a (small) percentage change in the number of adult-equivalents.
Although we will present our results for all θ, it is worth noting that reasonable values
range between approximately 0.4 and 0.8 (Burkhauser et al., 1996). We can rewrite
equation (2.2) as:
mk =( h nk)
θ ,0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 (2.3)
Using both equations (2.1) and (2.3), we get




Independent of a speciﬁcc h o i c ef o rθ, some interesting properties are satisﬁed. Notice
that singles without children (na =1 , nc =0 ) are the reference group, since their
equivalence scale always equals 1, for all θ. Furthermore, for extremely low (0)o r
extremely high (∞) household incomes, diﬀerences in household size do not imply
diﬀerences in “needs”. Finally, “needs” are bounded in several interesting ways. They
are clearly increasing in adult-equivalents. In addition, larger households (in adult-
equivalents) have scale advantages in “needs”, since they need not less income than
the reference type, but also not more than h nk times the income of the reference type,
to reach the same living standard.
52.2. Aggregating well-beings
We will consider two standard ways of aggregating well-beings into a measure of social
welfare, more precisely, via the family of S-Gini social welfare functions (Donaldson
and Weymark, 1981), and via a welfare dominance procedure (Shorrocks, 1983). In









V (x,F ∗)dF ∗
k (x) (2.5)
Social welfare consists of two parts: (i) the valuation of living standards x via a
valuation function V — which might be non-individualistic by taking the weighted
distribution F∗ into account — and (ii) the actual aggregation of these valuations via
weighted distributions F∗
k.
As should be clear from the introduction, choosing either individuals or equivalent
individuals as the unit of analysis is a normative choice. The weighted distribution
F∗ can be generally deﬁned as
F∗
k : x → p∗
kFk (mkx) (2.6)
For both weighting procedures, we have to choose the appropriate weighting vector
w =( w1,...,wK) to obtain normalized proportions p∗
k equal to
pkwk S
k pkwk for each type k.
Following Shorrocks (1995), we could weight households by the number of individuals
(wk = nk for all k)a n dp∗
k represents the proportion of individuals belonging to
type k. Following Ebert (1997), we can weight households by the equivalence scale
factors (wk = mk for all k)a n dp∗
k becomes the proportion of adult-equivalents.
Finally, we also consider the possibility of not weighting at all (wk =1for all k)
since this convention has been often used in practice.3 In this case p∗
k simply equals
the proportion of households pk. We stress that normatively speaking this scenario
is not interesting since it satisﬁes neither Pareto indiﬀerence nor the BTPD transfer
principle. Notice also that using equivalence scales as weights may coincide with not
weighting at all, if θ =0 .
Whereas both procedures aggregate in the same way, their valuation functions —
containing the ethical view of the social planner — are very diﬀerent. The S-Gini social
welfare functions weight living standards by a factor which depends on the position
of the income unit in the overall (weighted) distribution of living standards in the
following way (see Donaldson and Weymark, 1983):













measures the proportion of individuals, equivalent individuals or households with a
3Bishop, Chow, Formby and Ho (1997, p.191) even refer to this diﬀerence of household or person
weighting as one of the possible explanations for divergent empirical results in studies of changes in
US tax progressivity.
6living standard higher than x. Higher living standards get lower weights. In contrast
with the standard Gini valuation function, the S-Ginis add a distributional parameter
δ, 1 ≤ δ ≤∞ , which deﬁnes the relative weight attached to lower living standards.
Higher values for δ correspond with a relative higher concern for inequalities in living
standards. The limiting cases correspond with utilitarianism (δ → 1) and the maximin
social welfare function (δ →∞ ), while the standard Gini social welfare function can
be obtained when δ =2 .
The valuation function in the welfare dominance procedure does not depend on
the weighted distribution F∗:
V ◦ :( x,F∗) → V ◦ (x,F∗)=V (x) (2.8)
The twice diﬀerentiable valuation function contains the ethical view of the social
planner and we will stick to the standard assumptions that social welfare increases
when (1) living standards are higher (V
3
> 0 everywhere) and (2) living standards
are more equal (V
33
< 0 everywhere). The family of valuation functions satisfying
both of these conditions is denoted V.
Let us brieﬂy summarize. Either we use one of the S-Gini social welfare functions















k (x), 1 ≤ δ ≤∞ (2.9)
Or, we use the welfare dominance procedure which looks for unanimity among trans-








k (x), V ∈ V (2.10)
We want to analyze whether the choice of weighting scheme aﬀects the results,
more precisely the sign of ∆W = WF − WG. However, whereas a particular S-Gini
leads to a real number for ∆W, this is not the case for the welfare dominance pro-
cedure, since the latter leads to an inﬁnity of values for ∆W, one for each valuation
function belonging to V. Fortunately, there exists a more practical procedure. We
deﬁne the welfare dominance quasi-ordering (θ,w,V) such that F (θ,w,V) G means
that F welfare dominates G, given a choice for the equivalence scale elasticity θ,t h e
weighting vector w and the family of valuation functions V.M o r es p e c i ﬁcally, F wel-
fare dominates G if and only if ∆W is positive for all transformed utilitarian social
welfare functions corresponding with the speciﬁcc h o i c ef o r(θ,w,V). The following
lemma shows a classical equivalence result between welfare dominance (θ,w,V) and
generalized Lorenz dominance (GLD):









k (x) − G∗
k (x)]dx ≤ 0,∀a ∈ IR+ (2.11)
73. The data
Using the microsimulation model SIRe of the Ministery of Finance, we calculate tax
liabilities and disposable income before and after a recently decided personal income
tax reform.4 Although this reform will be implemented only gradually, we simulate
the complete reform, assuming, however, no changes in labour supply decisions overall.
Let us present brieﬂy the main features of the tax reform.
First, the top marginal tax rates (52.5% and 55%) are abolished, while the middle
tax brackets are widened considerably. Second, a refundable tax credit is introduced.
Over a range of low labour incomes, this tax credit ﬁrst gradually increases with
income, stays constant over a range to decrease again gradually. Third, the discrim-
ination between a married couple and a cohabitating couple is removed. On the one
hand, the tax exemption for a married couple will be set at the level of two (possibly
cohabitating) singles and taxes on non-labour incomes (income from ﬁnancial assets
or property) of married individuals will be levied separately. On the other hand, the
marital quotient — the possibility of shifting taxable income between spouses — will
be equally applicable for cohabitating singles.
The tax reform is not revenue neutral. We denote with t0 (y) and t1 (y) the tax lia-
bility for a given gross income y before and after the tax reform and d0 (y)=y−t0 (y)
and d1 (y)=y − t1 (y) represent the corresponding disposable incomes. T0 and T1
represent aggregate tax liabilities and D0 and D1 aggregate disposable income. The
percentage change in total taxes λ = T 1−T 0
T 0 equals -11.8%. The percentage change
in aggregate disposable income, denoted by ρ = D1−D0
D0 , equals +3.9%. Given such a
substantial tax reduction, a GL-dominance analysis will tend to favour the tax reform.
Therefore we have constructed two revenue neutral benchmarks. First, we compare
the tax reform with a reform — defended by social democrats — which would give all
households the same percentage increase in disposable income. We call this bench-
mark the ’RP-neutral’ one, since it holds residual progressivity constant (Lambert,
2001 p.220-221). We compare disposable incomes after the tax reform, d1 (y),w i t h
RP-adjusted disposable incomes, dRP (y),w i t hdRP (y)=( 1+ρ)d0 (y). Second, we
assess the tax reform relative to a benchmark — defended by liberal democrats — which
would give all households the same percentage reduction in tax liabilities. In this case,
liability progressivity is held constant, and we therefore refer to this benchmark as the
’LP-neutral’ one. We now compare disposable incomes after the tax reform, d1 (y),
with LP-adjusted disposable incomes dLP (y),w i t hdLP (y)=y − (1 + λ)t0 (y).W e
stress that both RP- and LP-neutral benckmarks are calculated on the basis of in-
comes rather than living standards and, as a consequence, average living standards
after taxes and after the benchmark reform are not necessarily the same.
4. Empirical results
We estimate the Generalized Lorenz curves and the S-Gini social welfare function on 9
ordinate points (we worked with deciles). An often neglected issue is that increasing
4To limit the inﬂuence of outliers we have trimmed the dataset with 1% on both upper and lower
tail.
8the number of intervals may seriously inﬂuence the dominance results, and/or the
number of crossings (see Howes, 1996). Furthermore, no statistical inference has been
performed for our results. Evidently this should be a topic for future research.
A social planner ultimately wants to know whether one of the heterogeneous in-
come distributions is better in terms of social welfare than the other. In our case,
he is interested whether the tax reform is better or worse compared to some bench-
mark tax reform. We can expect a social planner to prefer a robust comparison, so he
will logically start with the most general procedure to compare both heterogeneous
distributions, to wit the GLD procedure.
4.1. Welfare comparisons by means of the GLD procedure
Before analyzing the dominance results for the diﬀerent weighting methods, we want to
stress a crucial issue with respect to the interpretation of the results. When comparing
the eﬀect of two diﬀerent weighting methods on dominance analysis, we can basically
ﬁnd three results which have to be distinguished cautiously. Suppose ﬁrst that, for
some values for θ,w eﬁnd dominance in case of one weighting method and the opposite
dominance for another weighting method. In this case, the weighting undeniably plays
a crucial role. We can say that, for each of these peculiar values for θ, both weighting
methods lead to contradictory policy conclusions for all valuation functions in V.
The second possibility is that, for some values for θ,w eﬁnd dominance in case
of one weighting method and no dominance for another weighting method. Now we
can only state that, for each of these values for θ,t h e r ee x i s t sat least one valuation
function in V for which the policy recommendation contradicts. Finally, if we ﬁnd,
for some values of θ, that there is no dominance in case of two weighting methods,
then we cannot say anything at all. At ﬁrst sight, one could be inclined to conclude
that both weighting methods lead to the same result, to wit, no dominance, but this,
of course, is a too hasty conclusion. It might be the case that, for these values of θ,
all valuation functions are contradictory but it might also be the case that none are
actually contradictory. To conclude, the ﬁrst case would give a very clear answer to
the question whether weighting is empirically important, at least in case of our tax
reform evaluation, while the other two cases give a very vague or no idea at all about
the practical importance of weighting diﬀerently.
Figure 1 presents the dominance results for diﬀerent values of θ when using the RP
benchmark. The horizontal axis displays parameter θ from 0 to 1. The bars represent
the results for the three diﬀerent weighting schemes, shaded diﬀerently depending on
the result obtained.
9Figure 1: GLD comparison of the tax reform with the RP-neutral reform
With respect to the results themselves, we basically ﬁnd no dominance, except
when we use households as the unit of analysis. In the latter case, the RP-neutral tax
reform dominates the tax reform over a certain range of θ-values (the black part of the
bar). To put it diﬀerently, the tax reform is inferior to a tax reform which would have
increased disposable incomes proportionately. Second, in case of no dominance there
are two possibilities. Either the tax reform curve cuts the benchmark tax reform curve
from above (the shaded part of the bar). This means that valuation functions with
a high enough concern for inequality in living standards (a high degree of concavity)
will prefer the tax reform to the benchmark tax reform. Or, the tax reform curve cuts
the benchmark tax reform curve from below (no shading) which would, for the same
type of valuation functions, lead to the reverse conclusion.
For reasonable values of θ, the tax reform curve cuts the benchmark curve ﬁrst from
below (for weighting by the number of individuals even over the whole θ-range). This
means that for suﬃciently concave valuation functions the RP-benchmark is preferred
to the current tax reform. Only for low values of θ,t h eﬁrst crossing comes from above
in the case of weighting by household or by equivalent individuals, indicating that for
suﬃciently inequality averse valuation functions, the tax reform might be welfare
superior to the RP-benchmark.
With respect to the weighting issue, we cannot say much, unfortunately. As should
be clear from the introduction, those practitioners who choose households as the unit
of analysis should be aware that their choice is normatively doubtful, since none
of both attractive principles are satisﬁed. In addition, this choice could be relevant
empirically, or more precisely, for each value of θ within a range of approximately
[0.3,0.55], there exists at least one valuation function in the set V such that switching
to individuals or equivalent individuals as the unit of analysis would lead to the
10opposite conclusion (since the dominance gets lost). We will need a more ﬁne-tuned
approach if we want to give a more interesting meaning to “at least one”.
We now turn to GL-dominance with respect to the LP-neutral tax reform, pre-
sented in Figure 2. We again start with a discussion of the result itself. In the case
where the individual is chosen as the appropriate unit of analysis, we always ﬁnd that
the tax reform is better compared to the LP-neutral one (the black bar). This is con-
sistent with the rather safe assumption that the tax reform is a compromise between
the RP-neutral and the LP-neutral tax reform. In the case of using households, we
never ﬁnd dominance. But again, looking at the crossing of both curves, when using
valuation functions which do care enough about inequalities in living standards, we
obtain preference for the tax reform over an LP-neutral reform.
Figure 2: GLD comparison of the tax reform with the LP-neutral reform
Using equivalent individuals leads to very sensitive results. The result switches
between no dominance and dominance. Figure 2 is based on a grid over θ-values
in steps of 0.05. But a ﬁner grid with a stepsize of, e.g. 0.001, only corroborates
the sensitivity result. In many cases there was a switch between dominance and no
dominance for each increment in θ.5 If this extreme sensitivity is conﬁrmed in other
studies, and if it proves to be robust with respect to statistical tests, this might point
to an unexpected drawback of this weighting procedure. Given the fact that there
is no consensus about the right value for θ, using equivalent individuals as the unit
of analysis in generalized Lorenz dominance could turn out to be a rather indecisive
procedure if we want to obtain robust results with respect to the choice of equivalence
5For obvious reasons we could not display this extremely fanciful pattern in a ﬁgure.
11scales. With respect to the eﬀect of the diﬀerent weighting methods, we cannot say
much. For all values of θ, there exists at least one valuation function in V such that
switching between individuals and households leads to a contradictory result. Since
using equivalent individuals is, for all values of θ,d i ﬀerent from exactly one of the
other weighting methods, we get a similar, but unfortunately, minimal conclusion.
To summarize our generalized Lorenz dominance investigation, mainly two results
are worth repeating. For the results, an instability arises when using adult-equivalents
as the unit of analysis. For the weighting issue itself however, we are less successful.
Up till now we have to content ourself with ﬁnding “at least one” valuation function
for which weighting is crucial. If we want to answer the weighting question we need
to ﬁnd a more precise quantitive statement of “at least one” and we therefore turn to
the S-Ginis in the next subsection.
4.2. Welfare comparisons by means of S-Gini social welfare functions
We start our analysis with applying the standard Gini social welfare function (δ =2
in equation (2.9)) to our data. Figure 3 illustrates our results, for diﬀerent values of
θ and for the diﬀerent weighting methods. Only for large enough values of θ,w eﬁnd
that the three methods agree and prefer the actual reform to the RP-neutral one.
But for lower values of θ there is a conﬂict between weighting by individuals on the
one hand, and the two other procedures on the other hand. Individual weighting
always concludes that the actual reform is welfare superior with respect to the RP-
neutral one. But the other two methods (household and equivalent weighting) lead
to the opposite conclusion. We do not present a ﬁgure for the comparison with the
LP-neutral benchmark since all methods prefer the tax reform to the LP-neutral one
for all values of θ. Of course, the particular choice for the distributional parameter
δ is rather arbitrary and therefore we propose an S-Gini dominance procedure for all
values of δ between 1 and 5 and the results w.r.t. the RP-neutral benchmark are
p r e s e n t e di nF i g u r e4 .
12Figure 3: S-Gini social welfare comparison (δ =2 ) of the tax reform with the RP-neutral reform
Figure 4: S-Gini social welfare comparison (1 ≤ δ ≤ 5) of the tax reform with a RP-neutral reform
Since the S-Gini social welfare functions are Lorenz consistent, they can be consid-
ered to be a subset of the set of of valuation functions V,f o rw h i c hw eh a v ei n s p e c t e d
13the GLD criterion. Hence it will not come as a surprise that we ﬁnd more dominance
results in ﬁgure 4 when compared with ﬁgure 1. The limited dominance result for
household weighting in ﬁgure 1, has now been extended over the whole range of θ-
values from 0 up to .6. Also for individual weighting, where no dominance was found
in ﬁgure 1, we ﬁnd a dominance result now. For θ- v a l u e sf r o m. 6t o1 . 0 ,t h et a xr e f o r m
increases social welfare for the speciﬁed subset of S-Gini social welfare functions. In
the light of our research question, the fact that this reversal of the dominance pattern
between household and individual weighting only occurs at diﬀerent values of θ,i s
but scant comfort for the practitioner. Within a reasonable range of θ-values, the
dominance result does change. Moreover, for all values of θ, we know there exists at
least one valuation function where the conclusion is reversed. Finally, looking at the
procedure of equivalized weighting, the picture still becomes more gloomy. The fanci-
ful pattern of ﬁgure 2 (where we compared with the LP-benchmark) now reappears.
Running through the θ-scale, we switch from dominance to non-dominance.6
To get a better insight in the magnitude of disagreement between the diﬀerent
weighting methods, we ﬁnally present in Figure 5, for each value of θ, the percentage
of S-Gini social welfare functions7 where conﬂicts arise between the diﬀerent weighting
methods for the RP-benchmark.
Figure 5: Percentage of δ b e t w e e n1a n d5f o rw h i c hac o n ﬂict arises (using RP benchmark)
6This result appears in a weaker form in the comparison with the LP-benchmark. With household
weighting we ﬁnd non-dominance throughout the whole θ-range. With individual weighting, we ﬁnd
dominance of the actual reform over the LP-benchmark throughout the whole θ-range. Only for
weighting with equivalence scales, the pattern is mixed: everywhere non-dominance, interrupted by
dominance of the actual reform at the values .55 and .60 for θ.
7With a distributional parameter δ between reasonable values of 1 and 5 in steps of 0.1. Changing
the range and/or the grid does not alter the results.
14The picture is revealing. The percentage of conﬂicts is largest between using house-
holds and one of the other methods, and a signiﬁcant peak occurs for rather reasonable
values of θ (around .6). Between the normatively more interesting weighting methods,
the number of conﬂicts decreases with θ.
5. Conclusion
Given the impossibility of reconciling two normatively interesting properties, a choice
between the corresponding weighting schemes is inevitable. The question we pose in
our paper is whether the choice for one or another weighting scheme also matters
empirically. We apply three diﬀerent weighting methods to assess the 2000 reform
proposal of personal income taxes in Belgium simulated via the microsimulation model
SIRe of the Belgian Ministery of Finance.
We do ﬁnd sensitivity of the results with respect to the diﬀerent weighting meth-
ods. As a result, not weighting households is both normatively uninteresting and
makes a diﬀerence empirically. In addition, using the number of equivalent individ-
uals as weights to perform dominance analysis, leads to quite fanciful results with
respect to the choice of equivalence scales. Hence, although this weighting method
is normatively interesting, it might turn out to be ineﬀective. Needless to say that
a profound statistical analysis is needed, to check whether our results will stand the
test of statistical signiﬁcance.
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